COP29: Six key reasons why international climate finance is a ‘wild west’

Developed nations have committed to providing billions of dollars of ‘climate finance’ to developing countries, as part of the global effort to tackle climate change.

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At the COP29 climate summit, nations must decide on a new global goal to replace the existing target of US$100 billion each year.

Delivering this money is widely viewed as important for helping vulnerable nations in the global south and maintaining trust between countries in UN climate talks. 

Yet, for decades, climate finance has been plagued by accusations of exaggerated numberspoor transparency and money going to “questionable” places. Much of this stems from a lack of consensus on what counts as “climate finance”. 

Most climate finance comes from the aid budgets of a handful of developed states, including western Europe, the US and Japan. Governments use their own criteria to assess “climate finance”, often prompting criticism from civil society groups and developing countries.

Most climate finance goes towards legitimate causes. However, analysis of the available data reveals examples of countries reporting funds going to, say, fossil fuels and airports. Some donors report finance that may never be spent and others hand out loans that, ultimately, see them making a profit. 

These activities are all allowed under the UN climate finance system.

As countries gather to negotiate a new climate-finance target at COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, Carbon Brief – in no particular order – explores six of the issues that make climate finance such a “wild west”.

1. There is no agreed definition of what counts as ‘climate finance’

There is no universal agreement on what should, or should not, count towards the international “climate finance” provided by developed countries to developing countries.

Unofficial definitions, including those of the UN Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), broadly agree that climate finance should support activities that cut emissions or help adapt to climate change.

As for the types of finance that should count, nations decided that the US$100 billion target would cover “a wide variety of sources”, including public money, support via multilateral development banks (MDBs) and private investment spurred by public spending.

However, the kinds of activities and finance streams falling into these broad categories are open to interpretation. In practice, governments of developed countries use their own methodologies and set their own rules when reporting climate finance. 

Developed countries also pledged to provide climate finance that is “new and additional” – a term often taken to mean extra funding on top of other aid programmes. However, this framing is contested and, in practice, much of the reported climate finance comes from existing development budgets. 

Prof Romain Weikmans, an international climate-finance researcher at the Free University of Brussels, tells Carbon Brief that developed countries have “diverging understandings on what should count as climate finance and on how to count it”. He adds that reporting requirements negotiated at the UN “allow countries to remain vague”.

Many expert analyses have concluded that self-reporting by governments, facing political pressure to act on climate change, contributes to an “overestimation” of total climate finance. 

While it was widely reported that, based on OECD data, developed countries met the US$100 billion target two years late in 2022, Weikmans says the lack of a universal definition “makes it impossible to assess whether the US$100 billion has been met or not”. 

The chart below shows how different assumptions about “climate finance” by key financial organisations lead to divergent estimates of how much has been provided.

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Estimates of climate finance, US$ billion, by channel of provision, from different organisations. Oxfam’s figures present its figures as an average of the years 2019 and 2020, and the Indian Ministry of Finance only conducted its assessment on a one-off basis in 2015. Source: Figures compiled by UNFCCC SCF, Oxfam.

Igor Shishlov, head of climate finance at Perspectives Climate Group, tells Carbon Brief that the lack of clarity contributes to an “erosion of trust” in climate negotiations between developed and developing countries.

These tensions have existed since the start of UN climate negotiations in the 1990s. An attempt by COP presidencies in 2015 to “reassure” nations about progress towards the US$100 billion goal with a special OECD report ended up sparking more disputes

(A response at the time from the Indian Ministry of Finance – reflected in the chart above – estimated that climate finance was 26 times smaller than the OECD estimate. This was based on money that had been paid out, rather than pledged, from climate funds deemed “new and additional”.)

Efforts since then to agree on a definition have failedJoe Thwaites, a senior advocate on international climate finance at NRDC, tells Carbon Brief that both developed and developing countries contribute to this deadlock:

“Developed countries oppose a definition that would restrict climate finance to certain financial instruments, while petrostates oppose a definition that would exclude counting funding for fossil-fuel projects as climate finance.”

As countries negotiate the “new collective quantified goal” (NCQG) for climate finance at COP29, observers say it is unlikely that nations will make significant progress on a comprehensive definition. 

2. Climate-finance accounting is not consistent or transparent

The systems for climate-finance accounting have been described as full of “inconsistencies” and “discrepancies”, as well as “prone to huge overestimations”.

Joseph Kraus, senior policy director at the ONE Campaign, which has attempted its own assessment of climate finance based on available data, tells Carbon Brief:

“Climate finance accounting is like the wild west: Every climate finance provider makes its own rules about what to count. Predictably, that makes it virtually impossible to get accurate numbers.”

Governments report their climate-finance contributions to three major international bodies: the OECD; the UNFCCC; and, in the case of EU member states, the European Commission.

Most climate finance is drawn from developed countries’ aid budgets and they register their bilateral contributions in the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS). Officials then mark projects as being related to climate mitigation or adaptation.

This “Rio marker system” was implemented in 1998 to assess whether aid projects align with the three “Rio Conventions” on climate change, biodiversity and desertification.

The tags were never meant to define the amount of “climate finance” counted under the UN system. They have effectively filled the gap left by the lack of official guidance.

Most developed countries use the data submitted to the OECD CRS to guide what they report as “official” climate finance in reports to the UNFCCC. Only a handful, including the UK and the US, assess projects on a more case-by-case basis.

Governments use the Rio Markers to calculate climate finance in different ways. Most say they count 100 per cent of the projects where climate has been marked as a “principal” objective towards their UNFCCC totals.

Projects where climate is deemed “significant”, implying a partial focus on climate, vary a lot more. Countries state that they report between 30 per cent and 50 per cent of these projects as climate finance. 

Analysts have warned that the blanket application of fixed percentages is arbitrary and can lead to figures being inflated. They also note that, in practice, UNFCCC and OECD figures are difficult to compare and do not always match up in the ways countries report them.

The figures for bilateral climate finance that developed countries report to the UNFCCC are used as the basis for the OECD’s annual reports of progress towards the US$100 billion goal. They are combined with the OECD’s figures for MDBs, multilateral funds and the private sector.

(These are generally cited as the definitive figures for US$100 billion tracking, although they are contested. The OECD does not provide a breakdown of contributors to the target and its reports are released two years in arrears, making real-time scrutiny difficult.)

While the OECD screens projects reported in its system, it has no power to amend those that have been marked “incorrectly”. Analysis by Development Initiatives of climate-related aid projects found countries, such as France, Japan and Australia, frequently tagged projects that “deviated” from OECD guidance – those that include fossil fuels, for example. 

Independent audits in Denmark, the Netherlands and the EU have all found significant evidence of “climate” projects being mislabelled, or their relevance overstated. 

Reflecting on the wider state of climate-finance accounting, Thwaites tells Carbon Brief:

“I think understanding of climate finance is getting better, both through improvements in official reporting and through greater scrutiny from journalists and civil society. But as those third-party audits have shown, there is much room for improvement.”

All of this is further complicated by the lack of transparency from governments, when reporting their official climate-finance contributions to the UNFCCC. The lack of detail in submissions makes it difficult to assess the relevance of each project for tackling climate change. 

For example, NGO FragDenStaat has documented its difficulties evaluating the German government’s claim that its climate finance reached a “record level” in 2022.

Poor transparency makes it difficult for those in developing countries as well. Turkish banks have received millions of dollars in climate finance from Germany and France, but there is little information provided either by the banks or the donors on how it is used.

“Citizens have no access to any information about these public funds,” Özgür Gürbüz, campaign director of the Turkish NGO Ekosfer, tells Carbon Brief.

Sehr Raheja, a programme officer specialising in climate finance at the Centre for Science and Environment in India, tells Carbon Brief:

“Implications…include the inability to clearly hold actors accountable, or even first understand the complete reality of the situation of climate finance for developing countries.”

Such scrutiny is important. The UK has traditionally been viewed as one of the more rigorous climate-finance reporters, but the government loosened its accounting system in 2023 to bring it more in line with those of less strict donors. 

In doing so, an independent audit found that the UK added an extra £1.7 billion (US$2.2 billion) to its projected climate finance spending without contributing any new funds, as the chart below shows. 

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Annual UK international climate finance spending, £ billion, by financial year for the period 2011-12 to 2025-26. The red area indicated finance that has been included in the totals following changes to the UK government’s methodology for calculating its climate finance. The blue area indicates climate finance before those methodology changes, with the figures for 2023-24 to 2025-26 representing the average value from a range of forecasts. Source: Carbon Brief analysis, UK government data.

3. Some climate finance is not helping to tackle climate change

Climate-finance databases contain details of tens of thousands of projects operating in developing countries around the world.

Most of these projects have clear links to tackling climate change. They might, for example, support solar power projects in Kenya, the construction of a train line in India, or improving the climate resilience of drought-prone farms in Guatemala.

However, among them are aid projects that may bring benefits to the target countries, but have little or no relevance for tackling climate change. Some could even undermine such efforts, by supporting fossil fuels and carbon-intensive sectors.

Stacy-ann Robinson, a climate-adaptation finance researcher at Emory University in the US state of Georgia, tells Carbon Brief that some climate finance “has been going to questionable places to support objectives that are clearly not related to…reducing vulnerability or increasing resilience”.

Some assessments indicate that “inaccurately” categorised climate projects are relatively common among the largest donors, notably Japan and France. NGOs have also identified many “troubling and high-emitting projects” reported as climate finance by MDBs.

Over the years, researchers and journalists have unearthed climate finance being used to, for example, buy uniforms for park rangerssupport anti-terrorism programmes and fund luxury hotels

However, the overall lack of transparency makes it difficult to ascertain exactly how much money from these “questionable” projects is feeding into the official totals reported to the OECD. 

An investigation by Reuters in 2023 uncovered US$3 billion of finance reported to the UNFCCC that had gone towards “programmes that do little or nothing to ease the effects of climate change”. However, Reuters noted that its review only covered around 10 per cent of countries’ submissions.

Carbon Brief has identified at least US$6.5 billion of finance attributed to projects involving coal, oil and gas that has been tagged as climate-related in the OECD’s climate-related aid database, over the decade from 2012-2021. If countries have followed their own guidelines for reporting climate finance, much of this money will have been reported to the UNFCCC.

Japan is frequently cited for labelling fossil-fuel finance as climate finance, including billions of dollars for coal- and gas-fired power plants in places such as Bangladesh and Indonesia.

However, Carbon Brief’s assessment of the data reveals that some European countries have also been reporting smaller amounts of fossil fuel-related “climate finance”. 

For example, Sweden counted around €5m for a gas-fired power plant in Mozambique between 2012 and 2015, while Germany supported a gas power plant in the Ivory Coast in 2022. In both cases, the governments have confirmed to Carbon Brief that projects marked in the OECD registry were also reported to the UNFCCC.

Defenders of fossil-fuel finance argue that developing countries need investment in cleaner or more efficient fossil-fuel infrastructure – and that this does, in fact, reduce emissions. Others argue that these funds simply should not be labelled as climate-related.

Another example of questionable climate finance comes from the French development finance institution Proparco, which provided a €20m loan to Cabo Verde Airports in 2023, a subsidiary of French construction company Vinci Group

This project was too recent to have been officially reported to the UNFCCC. However, Proparco has reported that 20 per cent of its financing for the project would lead to “climate co-benefits”, such as “renewable energy investments, the installation of LED lighting and the replacement of air-conditioning systems”.

At the same time, Vinci Group says its other goal is to help Cabo Verde boost tourism through increased traffic at its airports. The company has celebrated “record passenger numbers” at its Cabo Verde airports, where traffic increased by 17 per cent year-on-year in August thanks to rising passenger flows from western Europe.

4. Reliance on loans ‘overstates’ climate finance flows

Most climate finance is delivered as loans to developing countries and their institutions. This is one of the most contentious issues in international climate-finance reporting.

More than half of the bilateral finance committed by wealthy countries – and around three-quarters of the investments by MDBs – comes in the form of loans, as shown by the red bars in the figure below.

In fact, the nations that consistently rank among the largest climate-finance providers – Japan, France and the US – all provide the majority of their climate finance as loans.

Loans have to be paid back, leading to climate finance returning to contributor countries as profits, through repayments plus interest. This has led to accusations by civil society groups that developed countries “overstate” their climate finance by leaning heavily on loans.

Public climate-finance institutions generally offer loans at lower-than-market “concessional” rates, or else with longer repayment periods. 

However, Carbon Brief analysis shows that at least US$18 billion of official climate finance reported by developed countries between 2015 and 2020 – roughly 10 per cent of the total – was “non-concessional”, as the chart below shows. (While less desirable than loans officially described as “concessional”, these public institution loans are still generally offered at better-than-market rates.)

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Bilateral climate finance reported by developing countries to the UNFCCC, broken down by per cent of “non-concessional” loans (light red), all other loans (dark red), grants (dark blue) and other types of finance, such as export credits (light blue). Source: Carbon Brief analysis, UNFCCC biennial report data compiled by Reuters.

The reliance on loans is especially controversial amid the debt crisis facing many developing countries. 

The world’s least-developed countries and small-island developing states collectively spent twice as much repaying debts in 2022 as they received in climate finance, according to analysis by the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED).

There has been considerable pressure from civil society, researchers, developing countries and even UN climate chief Simon Stiell to increase the “concessionality” of climate finance.

NGOs, such as Oxfam, argue that climate-related loans should be reported as “grant equivalents”, rather than at face value. This is a measure of how much the developed-country government is subsidising the loan.

Since 2018, development aid reported in the OECD’s database has been expressed in grant equivalents in order to better communicate the “financial effort” being made by donors. 

However, when the OECD reports progress towards the US$100 billion climate-finance goal, drawing from developed countries’ reports to the UNFCCC, it still uses face-value figures for loans. This is one of the key reasons that developing countries have disputed these figures.

Oxfam releases an annual report that drastically downgrades the OECD figures, primarily by using grant equivalent values. Rather than exceeding the US$100 billion goal in 2022, the NGO argues that developed countries’ true financial effort only amounted to around US$28-35 billion that year.

From 2024, countries will be able to start reporting loans in grant-equivalent amounts to the UNFCCC in the newly introduced “biennial transparency reports” (BTRs) that all nations must file under the Paris Agreement. However, they are not required to do so, meaning it is unlikely that an “official” total for grant-equivalent loans will be available.

5. Countries are reporting money that may never get spent

Climate finance only has an impact when it is provided – or “disbursed” – to people and institutions who can use the money.

Yet some countries, including France, Germany and Denmark, choose not to report the amount of climate finance they have actually provided to developing countries. 

Instead, they record the amount they have “committed”, or else a mix of committed and provided sums. These numbers feed into the totals reported by national governments and they count towards the US$100 billion target, even if the money has not left the donor country.

The OECD defines a commitment as a “firm written obligation by a government or official agency”. Over time, the amount of money provided should match the amount committed.

But between a nation committing money and handing it out, all sorts of things can change, as Mattias Söderberg, global climate lead at the NGO DanChurchAid, tells Carbon Brief:

“In some situations, projects are interrupted. Changes in the context or in the projects or within partners, for example, when there was a coup in Mali, means that committed funds may not be disbursed as planned.”

Climate projects could also collapse because a new government in the donor country decides to cancel the project for political or financial reasons. Other issues, such as shifting exchange rates, can also lead to divergences between committed and disbursed funds.

The reliance on commitments to meet climate-finance targets has drawn criticism. In its 2015 critique of progress towards the US$100 billion target, the Indian government said it needed “actual disbursements” rather than “promises, pledges or multi-year commitments about promised sums in the future”.

An analysis by ONE Campaign of climate-related aid reported to the OECD found that, of US$616 billion committed since 2013, data was missing for US$69 billion of disbursements and another US$228 billion had not yet been disbursed. (This data is not a direct reflection of “climate finance” under the UN, but it is a rough proxy.)

Some lag between commitments and payments is to be expected. Countries tend to commit to big climate-finance projects and then gradually pay out the money over time. 

However, civil society groups have highlighted “significant differences” between committed and provided sums. 

In recent years, EU member states have had to start reporting both commitments and disbursements. The chart below shows the sizable gap between the money Germany, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and Italy pledge and the amount they provide. 

(It is worth noting that there is significant variability. Sweden sometimes provides more finance than it commits, whereas, in two years, France did not report disbursements at all.)

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Total climate finance reported by the top five EU member state donors - Germany, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and Italy - that has been “committed” (blue) or “provided” (red) to developing countries each year. Source: Carbon Brief analysis, EU Governance Regulation data.

Identifying climate-finance projects that have completely failed to pay out is difficult. Governments are not obliged to report to the UNFCCC when they have provided finance and neither do they have to update the record to reflect any cancellations or changes.

Reuters identified three French climate projects between 2016-2018 – collectively worth half a billion dollars – that had been cancelled. This equates to 4 per cent of France’s climate finance over this period.

“Commitments look better, so more effort is put into reporting them than into tracking actual disbursements,” Kraus from ONE Campaign tells Carbon Brief.

Civil society groups argue that all governments should start reporting disbursements to reduce the risk of “over-reporting”.

6. Climate finance is used to boost donors’ economic interests

Developed nations provide climate finance in a variety of different ways. 

In projects that involve building infrastructure, such as windfarms and train lines, companies must be enlisted to work on the engineering and construction. Often, donor governments will work with firms based in their own countries to carry out climate projects. 

The French Development Agency (AFD) has reported that the majority of its aid is entrusted to projects involving at least one French “economic actor”, resulting in significant economic benefits for the country. 

Meanwhile, one-third of Japanese climate loans are given with the condition that Japanese companies are hired to work on the project, according to Reuters analysis of OECD data.

Stacy-ann Robinson of Emory University notes that this is not a “black-and-white” issue, as sometimes a company from the donor nation will be best placed to carry out the project. However, she notes that it has implications for capacity building in developing countries.

France has committed billions of dollars towards rail infrastructure in developing countries.  Given France’s global leadership in the sector, a significant share of these projects have been implemented by French companies.

Project-level data about which companies are awarded contracts is not reported to the UNFCCC. However, one climate-finance project identified by Carbon Brief involves €230m worth of loans provided by AFD for an express regional train in the Senegalese capital, Dakar. This was co-funded with an extra €1 billion from development banks.

While the project has clear benefits for the decarbonisation of transport in Dakar, it also helped several French companies expand their activities in the region. 

These include Eiffage, which built the infrastructure; Systra, which provided engineering consultancy services; Thales and Engie, which together won a €225m project to design and build the electricity infrastructure for the train; and Alstom, which supplied trains.

Reflecting on this issue, Robinson tells Carbon Brief:

“Perhaps we need regulations around the conditionalities associated with [climate] finance that would reduce the possibility of only French companies, for example, being able to work on these climate-finance projects.”

Another way climate finance might benefit donor nations is through projects that involve hiring consultants and other experts based domestically. One paper notes how such projects can result in money “flowing back to developed countries”.

Previous Carbon Brief analysis found that one-tenth of the climate funds disbursed by the UK between 2010 and 2023 had gone to private consultancies, largely based in the UK.

This article was developed with the support of Journalismfund Europe. Carbon Brief worked with journalists based in France, Germany, Sweden and Turkey, and they provided input on how different countries have been providing international climate finance.

This story was published with permission from Carbon Brief.

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